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Digital signatures are widely used in modern communication to guarantee authenticity and trans-
ferability of messages. The security of currently used classical schemes relies on computational
assumptions. We present a quantum signature scheme that does not require trusted quantum chan-
nels. We prove that it is unconditionally secure against the most general coherent attacks, and show
that it requires the transmission of significantly fewer quantum states than previous schemes. We
also show that the quantum channel noise threshold for our scheme is less strict than for distilling
a secure key using quantum key distribution. This shows that “direct” quantum signature schemes
can be preferable to signature schemes relying on secret shared keys generated using quantum key
distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Signature schemes allow for the exchange of messages
from one sender to multiple recipients, with the guar-
antee that messages cannot be forged or tampered with.
Additionally, messages can be transferred, and cannot be
repudiated. Transferability means that with a probabil-
ity that can be made arbitrarily close to one, if a message
is accepted by an honest recipient, it will also be accepted
by another recipient if forwarded. The related require-
ment of non-repudiation means that, except with proba-
bility that can be made arbitrarily small, a sender can-
not later successfully deny having sent a signed message.
Digital signatures are widely used for example in e-mail
and electronic commerce, and are considered to be one of
the most important inventions of modern cryptography.
Unfortunately, the security of commonly used signature
protocols relies on the assumed computational difficulty
of certain problems. In the United States, for example,
there are currently three approved algorithms for gener-
ating digital signatures – RSA, DSA and ECDSA – all of
which rely on the difficulty of finding discrete logarithms
or factoring large primes. With the advent of quantum
computers, such assumptions would no longer be valid.
Given the importance of digital signatures, there is thus a
strong motivation to develop practical signature schemes
whose security is unconditional, i.e. guaranteed by the
laws of physics, without any computational assumptions.
Unconditionally secure “classical” signature schemes
are possible, but need, at the very least, shared secret
keys, and often also require a third party trusted by
everybody (who effectively can provide each participant
with secret information) [1–4]. Shared secret keys can of
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course be generated by quantum key distribution (QKD),
so that an unconditionally secure signature scheme can
proceed by first generating secret keys via QKD, and then
running e.g. the protocol P2 in [4]. Unconditionally se-
cure “direct” quantum signature schemes proceed with-
out first distilling highly secure shared secret keys [4–7].
It is an open question what the best unconditionally se-
cure signature schemes are, with respect to the number
of quantum transmissions required per signed bit, trust
assumptions, requirements on communication channels,
and so on. In this paper, we explicitly demonstrate that
“direct” quantum signature schemes can have advantages
over schemes relying on secret shared keys generated via
QKD, by showing that the “direct” scheme we propose
can tolerate more noise in the quantum channels.
Previous quantum signature schemes [4, 6, 7] improved
on the original Gottesman-Chuang scheme [5] by remov-
ing the need for quantum memory. In these quantum sig-
nature schemes, Alice encoded her signatures into quan-
tum states and sent a copy to both Bob and Charlie, who
were only able to gain partial information on the overall
signature due to the quantum nature of the states. How-
ever, the security analysis assumed authenticated quan-
tum channels that did not allow eavesdropping. This
strong and generally unrealistic assumption meant that
a potential forger (Bob) only had access to his own copy
of the signature states sent from Alice. In reality an ad-
versarial Bob would be able to gain extra information on
Alice’s signature through eavesdropping on the signature
states sent from Alice to Charlie.
Here we present a new quantum signature protocol,
with three improvements over previous protocols. First,
we remove all trust assumptions on the quantum chan-
nels. This is crucial for actual practical use of quantum
signature schemes. Second, instead of Alice sending the
same signature states to Bob and Charlie, Bob and Char-
lie send different states to Alice, which leads to increased
2efficiency. This departs from the “public-key” principle in
the earlier quantum signature schemes. Third, as already
mentioned above, we show that in our direct quantum
signature protocol, the noise threshold for the Alice-Bob
and Alice-Charlie quantum channels is less strict than
for distilling a secret key using quantum key distribution
(QKD).
II. THE PROTOCOL
We outline our protocol for three parties, with a
sender, Alice, and two receivers Bob and Charlie. Gen-
eralisation to more parties is possible, but special care
should be taken to address colluding adversaries (see e.g.
[8]). In the three-party scenario, at most one party can
be dishonest, since two colluding dishonest parties can
trivially cheat on the third party. In the multiparty sce-
nario, the maximum number of dishonest parties will de-
pend on the method of dispute resolution. If a majority
vote is used to resolve disputes, then a majority of the
participants must be honest. Also, transferability and
non-repudiation become identical in a three-party sce-
nario when majority vote dispute resolution is used. We
assume that between Alice and Bob, and between Alice
and Charlie there exists authenticated classical channels
as well as untrusted, imperfect quantum channels. In ad-
dition, Bob and Charlie share a QKD link which can be
used to transmit classical messages in full secrecy. The
protocol makes use of a key-generating protocol (KGP)
performed in pairs separately by Alice-Bob and Alice-
Charlie. The KGP uses the noisy untrusted quantum
channels, and generates two correlated bit strings, one
for the sender and one for the receiver. When the noise
level is below the prescribed threshold, the Hamming dis-
tance between the receiver’s string and the sender’s string
is smaller than the Hamming distance between any string
an eavesdropper could produce and the sender’s string.
The KGP is further discussed below, after presenting the
signature protocol itself.
The quantum signature protocol has two parts, a dis-
tribution stage, where the scheme is set up, and a mes-
saging stage, when messages are sent and signed. The
distribution stage involves both classical and quantum
communication, but all communication in the messaging
stage is classical. We show how to sign a one-bit message.
Longer messages can be signed for example by suitably
iterating the one-bit protocol, as in [9].
A. Distribution stage
(1) For each possible future message m=0 or 1, Alice
uses the KGP to generate four different length L keys,
AB0 , A
B
1 , A
C
0 , A
C
1 , where the superscript denotes the
participant with whom she performed the KGP and the
subscript denotes the future message, to be decided later
by Alice. Bob holds the length L strings KB0 ,K
B
1 and
Charlie holds the length L strings KC0 ,K
C
1 . Due to the
KGP, we know that AB0 contains fewer mismatches with
KB0 than does any string produced by an eavesdropper,
and the same applies to the other pairs of strings.
Alice’s signature for the future message m will be
Sigm = (A
B
m, A
C
m). Essentially, what will protect against
forging is that only Alice knows a valid signature for a
message m.
(2) For each future message, Bob and Charlie symmetrise
their keys by choosing half of the bit values in their
KBm,K
C
m and sending them (as well as the corresponding
positions) to the other participant using the Bob-Charlie
secret classical channel. As explained below, this ensures
that Alice cannot make Bob and Charlie disagree on the
validity of a signature if a message is forwarded from Bob
to Charlie or vice versa in the messaging stage. If Bob (or
Charlie) chooses to forward an element ofKBm (or K
C
m) in
the distribution stage, he will not further use it to check
the validity of a signature. They will only use the bits
they did not forward and those received from the other
participant [10]. We denote their symmetrised keys by
SBm and S
C
m, with the superscript indicating whether the
key is held by Bob or Charlie. Bob (and Charlie) will
keep a record of whether an element in SBm ( S
C
m) came
directly from Alice or whether it was forwarded to him
by Charlie (or Bob).
At this point in the protocol, Bob’s and Charlie’s sym-
metrised strings each contain half of KBm and half of K
C
m.
For each future possible messagem, Bob and Charlie each
have a bit string of length L, and Alice has no information
on whether it is Bob’s SBm or Charlie’s S
C
m that contains
a particular element of the string (KBm,K
C
m), which has
length 2L. This protects against repudiation. Bob has
access to all of KBm and half of K
C
m, but, even if he is
dishonest, he does not know the half of KCm that Charlie
chose to keep. This protects against forging by Bob (and
similarly for forging by Charlie).
B. Messaging stage
(1) To send a signed one-bit message m, Alice sends
(m,Sigm) to the desired recipient (say Bob).
(2) Bob checks whether (m,Sigm) matches his S
B
m
and records the number of mismatches he finds. He
separately checks the part of his key received directly
from Alice and the part of the key received from Charlie.
If there are fewer than sa(L/2) mismatches in both
halves of the key, where sa < 1/2 is a small threshold
determined by the parameters and the desired security
level of the protocol, then Bob accepts the message.
(3) To forward the message to Charlie, Bob forwards the
pair (m,Sigm) that he received from Alice.
(4) Charlie tests for mismatches in the same way, but
3in order to protect against repudiation by Alice he uses
a different threshold. Charlie accepts the forwarded
message if the number of mismatches in both halves of
his key is below sv(L/2) where sv is another threshold,
with 0 < sa < sv < 1/2. That the recipients have
to use different thresholds or acceptance criteria for
messages received directly from the sender and for
forwarded messages is a general and necessary feature
of unconditionally secure signature schemes [3, 8]. More
generally in a multiparty situation, thresholds depend
on how many times a message has been forwarded, and
the level of mismatches will determine how many times
a message can subsequently be forwarded.
III. KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL
We now describe how two parties, for now called Alice
and Bob, perform the KGP. Essentially, Alice and Bob
perform the quantum part of QKD to generate raw keys,
but do not proceed to error correction or privacy ampli-
fication. This means that Alice and Bob will generate
different (but correlated) strings that are not entirely se-
cret. These keys will be the ABi , K
B
i described above.
Even though the KGP builds on QKD, the security anal-
ysis for the KGP does not follow directly from the secu-
rity of the QKD protocol. This is because the goal of an
adversary in the signature protocol is different from that
of an eavesdropper in QKD. For the signature protocol,
what matters is the number of mismatches with a recip-
ient’s key; for QKD, what matters is the information an
eavesdropper can hold about the key. From the bound
on an eavesdropper’s min-entropy in QKD, we show how
to bound the number of mismatches a forger in our sig-
nature protocol can achieve. Our aim is to show that
d(ABi ,K
B
i ) < d(Eguess,K
B
i ) except with negligible prob-
ability, where d(., .) is the Hamming distance and Eguess
is Eve’s attempt at guessing KBi (and it may be that
Eve is Charlie). In addition to proving the security of
the KGP itself, the security of the signature protocol (in
which the KGP is used as a subprotocol) will be proven
below in Sec. IV.
In what follows, the underlying QKD protocol upon
which the KGP is built will be the prepare-and-measure
decoy-state BB84 protocol using weak coherent pulses,
described in [11]. Apart from the post-processing, an-
other difference is that here it is Bob who prepares the
states and sends them along the quantum channel to Al-
ice. This may not be necessary, but simplifies the security
analysis in that a dishonest Alice cannot send the recipi-
ents Bob and Charlie entangled states. Specifically, when
the KGP is performed by Bob and Alice, we assume that
Bob has a phase-randomised source of coherent states.
The intensity of each light pulse is chosen by Bob to be
either u1, u2, or u3, where u1 > u2 > u3. The inten-
sities are chosen with probabilities (pu1 , pu2 , pu3). As in
[11], we use all intensity levels for key generation. To
encode information, Bob randomly selects one of four
possible polarisation states – |0Z〉, |1Z〉 (Z basis) and
|0X〉 = 1/
√
2(|0Z〉+ |1Z〉), |1X〉 = 1/
√
2(|0Z〉 − |1Z〉) (X
basis). The X and Z bases are chosen with probabil-
ities pX ≥ 1/2 and pZ = 1 − pZ ≤ 1/2 respectively.
The asymmetric probabilities for the two bases increases
the efficiency of the protocol [12]. Intensities and states
are chosen independently by Bob to avoid correlations
between intensity and information encoding. Alice also
independently chooses the X and Z measurement bases
with probabilities pX and pZ respectively.
For each state sent by Bob, Alice obtains one of four
possible outcomes {0, 1, ∅, d} where 0 and 1 are the bit
values, ∅ represents no detection and d is a double click
event. In the case of double clicks, Alice randomly
chooses a bit value. Alice and Bob then announce their
basis and intensity choices over an authenticated classi-
cal channel. If states are transmitted and then measured
in different bases, or if there is no detection, they are
discarded (sifting). The protocol is continued until a suf-
ficient number of measurement outcomes have been ob-
tained for each basis and intensity choice. A raw key is
generated by choosing a random sample of size L + k of
the X basis counts. The bit string generated by Bob is
split into four parts (VB, ZB, XB,keep, XB,forward). Alice
will hold corresponding strings but with the subscript B
replaced by A. The V strings have length k and are gen-
erated from X basis measurements. They are used to es-
timate the correlation between Alice’s and Bob’s strings
generated from X basis measurements, after which they
are discarded. The Z strings are generated from Z basis
measurements. They will be used to quantify the level
of eavesdropping by Eve. Roughly speaking, due to the
complementary nature of the X and Z bases, eavesdrop-
ping must affect the correlations Alice and Bob would
expect to see in their states and measurement results,
and they can use a measure of their correlations to find
a quantitive bound on the min-entropy the eavesdropper
has on Bob’s X strings. The two XB strings have length
L/2 and together make up Bob’s key, KBi . Bob will for-
ward XB,forward to Charlie (who could in fact be Eve)
and will keep the other string, XB,keep, for himself. Bob
will no longer use the bits in XB,forward.
It should be stressed that in signature schemes it can-
not be assumed that Alice and Bob are honest. This
is another difference from standard QKD. However, as
explained below, neither of them gain from dishonesty
during the KGP, and therefore we can assume that they
behave honestly during the KGP stage.
In what follows we will consider the finite case, that is,
a finite number of states are sent and measured, with Eve
allowed to perform the most general attack permissible
by quantum mechanics – so-called “coherent” attacks.
This means that Eve can perform entangling operations
on any/all states sent over the quantum channel, and at
any later time make a general measurement on an ancilla
system kept in quantum memory.
Our strategy will be to find Eve’s information in terms
4of her smooth min-entropy, and use that to bound the
probability that she can make a signature declaration
containing fewer than a certain number of errors. To be-
gin with then, we must find Eve’s smooth min-entropy on
Bob’s key XB,keep. We follow [11] and find Eve’s smooth
min-entropy in the same manner as for decoy state QKD,
with the only difference being that here, Bob gives the
extra information XB,forward to Eve. However, since Bob
does not subsequently use this part of the key, this can
be treated in the same manner as is done for the V string
sacrificed for parameter estimation, as detailed more ex-
plicitly in Proposition 6 of [13]. Essentially, Eve’s smooth
min-entropy on XB,keep can be found using entropic un-
certainty relations based on the level of correlation be-
tween ZB and ZA. For ease of notation, we will simply
write X instead of XB,keep, and we will denote its length
by n. Eve also gains information from the classical com-
munication between Alice and Bob, which is assumed to
be public but authenticated. The classical random vari-
ables V , Θn and XB,forward represent the information
gained by Eve from parameter estimation, basis declara-
tions in the sifting step and, if Eve is Charlie, the for-
warding of XB,forward by Bob, respectively.
We gather all of Eve’s information into one quantum
system living in the Hilbert space HE . This comprises
the space containing Eve’s ancilla quantum system fol-
lowing her coherent attack, HE′ , as well as the spaces
containing the states encoding the strings V , Θn, and
XB,forward, which we assume are known to Eve. As in
Appendix B of [11], we find
Hǫmin(X |E) ' sLX,0 + sLX,1
[
1− h(φUX,1)
]
, (1)
Where the inequality holds up to a small additive term
proportional to log(1/ǫ). Here sLX,0 and s
L
X,1 are the num-
ber of pulses reaching Alice which come from 0- and 1-
photon pulses respectively, and which make up the entries
in the string X . φUX,1 is the phase error rate in X ba-
sis measurements coming from single-photon pulses. The
superscripts U and L represent worst-case scenario esti-
mates consistent with parameter estimation performed
on a finite sample (see Appendix A).
Now the question is, given Eve’s smooth min-entropy,
is it possible to bound the number of errors she is likely
to make when guessing Bob’s key?
Proposition 1. Suppose that Bob and Eve share the
state ρXE where, as above, X is the n-bit string repre-
senting the part of Bob’s key that is not forwarded to
Charlie/Eve, and E is the correlated quantum system
held by Eve, including all information gained from classi-
cal communications. Then, for any eavesdropping strat-
egy, Eve’s average probability of making at most r mis-
takes when guessing X can be bounded as
〈pr〉 ≤
r∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
2−H
ǫ
min(X|E)ρ + ǫ. (2)
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix B.
We can further use Markov’s inequality to say that for
any a > 0,
P(Eve makes fewer than r mistakes) := pr ≤ a (3)
except with probability at most
ǫF :=
1
a
(
brn2
−Hǫmin(X|E)ρ + ǫ
)
(4)
Where brn :=
∑r
k=0
(
n
k
)
and for large n, we have brn ≈
2nh(r/n). So we have found a bound on the probability
of Eve making fewer than r mistakes in terms of her
smooth min-entropy. Using this, as well as (1) for the
min-entropy, we find
ǫF =
1
a
[
2−n{cLX,0+cLX,1[1−h(φUX,1)]−h(r/n)} + ǫ
]
, (5)
where cLX,i := s
L
X,i/n is the lower bound on the count
rate for X basis pulses containing i photons. The equa-
tion above should technically have an approximation sign
rather than an equality since we have used the approx-
imate bound on the min-entropy from Eq. (1). It can
be made exact by including the terms proportional to
log(1/ǫ) in the min-entropy, however, for simplicity we
have neglected such terms in the main body of the pa-
per. The condition
cLX,0 + c
L
X,1[1− h(φUX,1)]− h(r/n) > 0 (6)
determines whether or not Eve is able to make fewer than
r errors with non-negligible probability. If the condition
holds, n can be increased to make Eve’s probability of
making fewer than r errors arbitrarily small. We define
pE by the equation
cLX,0 + c
L
X,1[1− h(φUX,1)]− h(pE) = 0. (7)
The meaning of this is that pE is the minimum rate at
which Eve can make errors (except with negligible prob-
ability). Suppose the error rate on X basis measurements
between Alice and Bob is upper bounded as eUX . As long
as pE > e
U
X , there exists a choice of parameters and a suf-
ficiently large signature length which makes the protocol
secure (see Section IV). Equivalently, QDS is possible as
long as
cLX,0 + c
L
X,1[1− h(φUX,1)]− h(eUX) > 0. (8)
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We will now prove the security of the main signature
protocol, i.e. the robustness (probability of an honest
run aborting), security against forging (probability that
a recipient generates a signature, not originating from
Alice, that is accepted as authentic) and repudiation (or
transferability) (probability that Alice generates a signa-
ture that is accepted by Bob but then when forwarded,
is rejected by Charlie). In what follows, we assume that
5Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie have each used the KGP to
generate length L bit strings to use in the QDS protocol
described above.
(a) Robustness. Bob rejects a signed message if the
L/2 bits received from either Alice or Charlie have a mis-
match rate higher than sa with Alice’s signature. From
parameter estimation performed on the strings VA, VB
(whose length we denote by k), Alice and Bob obtain an
estimate of the error rate they have with respect to each
other, for the strings they generated in the X basis. We
denote the observed error rate by e˜X . Using the Serfling
inequality [14], we can bound the actual error rate be-
tween the strings XA,keep and XB,keep (which we denote
as eX) by
eX ≤ e˜X + δ := eUX , (9)
where
δ :=
√
ln(1/ǫPE)
2k
(
1− k − 1
n
)
. (10)
This bound holds except with probability ǫPE . It can
be seen that for any fixed choice of δ, the failure proba-
bility ǫPE decays exponentially fast in the parameter k.
Let eUX,B, e
U
X,C be the worst-case error rates Alice has
from performing separate KGP’s with Bob and Charlie
respectively. Set eUX := max{eUX,B, eUX,C} and choose sa
such that sa > e
U
X . The Serfling inequality tells us that
the true error rate between Alice’s and Bob’s keys will
be less than eUX except with probability at most ǫPE , so
the probability of an honest abort is simply
P(Honest Abort) ≤ 2ǫPE, (11)
where the factor of 2 occurs since the abort can be due to
either the states received from Alice or the states received
from Charlie.
(b) Security against forging. It is easier for either Bob
or Charlie to forge than for any other external party, and
we will therefore consider forging by an internal party.
In order to forge a message, Bob must give a decla-
ration (m,Sigm) to Charlie that has fewer than svL/2
mismatches with the unknown (to Bob) half of SCm sent
directly from Alice to Charlie, and fewer than svL/2 mis-
matches with the half he himself forwarded to Charlie.
An adversarial Bob will obviously be able to meet the
threshold on the part he forwarded to Charlie. We there-
fore consider only the unknown half that was received
directly from Alice. If parameter estimation is successful
in the KGP, then we know the worst-case (maximum)
rate at which Alice will make errors with Charlie’s key;
we denote it by eUX . From Eq. (7), we also know the min-
imum rate at which Bob will make errors with Charlie’s
key; we denote it by pE .
Assuming (8) holds, we choose sv such that e
U
X < sv <
pE . In this case, Charlie will likely accept a legitimate
signature sent by Alice, since the upper bound on their
error rate, eUX , is less than the threshold sv. On the other
hand, Charlie will likely reject any dishonest signature
declaration by Bob, since the probability of Bob finding
a signature with an error rate smaller than sv is restricted
by equations (3) and (5) as
P(Eve makes fewer than svL/2 errors) := psvL/2 ≤ a
(12)
except with probability at most
ǫF :=
1
a
[
2
L
2
h(sv)−H
ǫ
min
(X|E)ρ + ǫ
]
(13)
Let us suppose that if any of the parameter estimation
procedures fail (so for example if eUX is not a good upper
bound), or if psvL/2 ≥ a, then Bob is able to successfully
forge with certainty. We are then able to bound Bob’s
probability of successfully forging as
P(Forge) ≤ a+ ǫF + 8ǫPE. (14)
This equation is valid for any choice of a, ǫ, ǫPE > 0 and
so can be made arbitrarily small by increasing L. The
addition of 8ǫPE is to account for the possibility of the
upper/lower bounds failing on any of the eX , sX,0, sX,1
or φX,1 (see Appendix A). Note that security against an
adversarial Bob derives entirely from the Alice-Charlie
KGP, in which Bob is already assumed to be an adver-
sary. Thus, any dishonesty on Bob’s part during the
Alice-Bob KGP cannot help him to forge. Exactly the
same arguments apply when Charlie is the forger.
(c) Security against repudiation. Alice aims to send a
declaration (m,Sigm) which Bob will accept and, when
forwarded, Charlie will reject. To do this, we must have
that Bob accepts both the elements that Alice sent di-
rectly to him and the elements that Charlie forwarded
to him. In order for Charlie to reject he needs only re-
ject one of either the elements he received from Alice, or
the elements Bob forwarded to him. Intuitively, security
against repudiation follows because of the symmetrisa-
tion performed by Bob and Charlie using the secret clas-
sical channel. Even if Alice knows and can control the
error rates between ABm, A
C
m and K
B
m, K
C
m, she cannot
control whether the errors end up with Bob or Charlie.
After symmetrisation, the keys SBm and S
C
m will each have
the same expected number of errors. To repudiate, one
must contain significantly more errors than the other.
Using results in [16], we can bound this probability as
P(Repudiation) ≤ 2 exp
[
−1
4
(sv − sa)2L
]
. (15)
For a more formal proof, please see Appendix C. Note
that security against repudiation derives entirely from
the symmetrisation performed by Bob and Charlie, in
which Alice plays no part. Even if Alice can control the
choices of sa, sv by manipulating the error rates achieved
during the Alice-Bob KGP and the Alice-Charlie KGP,
the choice of L depends on sa and sv and the protocol
will be secure for any valid choice.
6V. COMPARISON TO QKD
For the BB84 protocol performed using decoy states
as described above, with a finite number of states sent
and received, Appendix B of [11] gives the length of the
extractable secret key as
l =
⌊
sLX,0 + s
L
X,1
[
1− h(φUX,1)
]− λEC − log 2
ǫcor(α2α3ν)2
⌋
≈ sLX,0 + sLX,1
[
1− h(φUX,1)
] − λEC ,
(16)
where ǫcor and ν are constants related to the possibility
of failure of error correction and privacy amplification.
The term λEC represents the information leaked to Eve
during error correction. It depends on the specific im-
plementation, but must be greater or equal to nh(eUX),
where n is the size of the bit string being corrected. In
practice, error correction will not be perfect and it is com-
mon to write λEC = nfECh(e
U
X) where fEC is a leakage
parameter. To perform error correction, the total key
is split into blocks and the leakage parameter, fEC , de-
pends on this block size, but not the overall length of the
key. Increasing the block size reduces fEC at the cost of
decreasing the efficiency of the error correction protocol.
Estimates of fEC for practically feasible error correction
is an area of active research [17], though it is commonly
estimated to be in the range 1.11− 1.2, regardless of the
length of the total key being distilled. For example, [18]
assumes fEC = 1.2 based on the performance of error-
correcting codes in use at ID Quantique. Rewriting (16),
we obtain
l ≈ n{cLX,0 + cLX,1 [1− h(φUX,1)]− fECh(eUX)} . (17)
Comparing equations (8) and (17), we immediately see
that there are Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie quantum
channels for which quantum signatures are possible and
yet practical QKD gives a zero key generation rate. As
stated above, fEC is independent of n and so cannot be
decreased by simply increasing the size of the total key.
The important point is that because the quantum signa-
ture scheme omits the inefficient process of error correc-
tion, there should always be some region where quantum
signature generation is possible but QKD is not.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have presented a quantum signature
protocol and proven it unconditionally secure against co-
herent attacks. It improves on previous quantum sig-
nature protocols by removing all trust assumptions on
the quantum channels between participants. One might
have expected that a protocol that does not rely on these
assumptions must necessarily be less efficient. However,
our protocol also significantly reduces the length of the
signature needed to sign a message. To facilitate com-
parison to previous quantum signature protocols, sup-
pose one wants the probabilities in (11), (14), (15) to all
be below 10−4. Using realistic experimental quantities
(taken from [19]), we estimate that a signature length of
L = 7.71×105 (for each of the possible one-bit messages 0
and 1) is required to securely sign a one-bit message, sent
over a distance of 50 km. This would require Bob/Charlie
to transmit approximately 6.3×108 quantum states (per
bit to be signed) to Alice during their KGP’s (see Ap-
pendix D). We compare this to previous quantum signa-
ture protocols which required O(1010) states to be trans-
mitted to achieve the same level of security over 1 km
[20].
The increase in efficiency is largely due to the fact
that in our protocol Bob and Charlie send Alice differ-
ent states, whereas in previous protocols Alice sent Bob
and Charlie the same signature states. In those proto-
cols, even without any eavesdropping, a potential forger
has access to a legitimate copy of each of the states Al-
ice sent to the participants, and thus to reach the same
levels of security requires longer signatures. Moreover,
when generalising to N participants with up to t dishon-
est parties, potentially colluding forgers are even more
powerful, since they may have t legitimate copies of each
state. In our protocol, where different states are sent
by each participant, this problem is evaded. The only
source of information for a potential forger is by eaves-
dropping on the quantum channels, an activity not even
considered in previous protocols due to the assumption
of “authenticated” quantum channels.
We also showed that the noise threshold in the quan-
tum channels connecting Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie is
in practice less strict for quantum signatures than for
distilling a secret key using QKD. For some quantum
channels, therefore, quantum signature protocols that
use QKD (e.g. P2 of [4]) are not possible, while our direct
quantum protocol remains possible. This is an example
that direct quantum protocols are sometimes preferable
to protocols relying on secret shared keys generated using
standard QKD, and highlights that quantum signature
protocols are not in general merely a direct combination
of QKD protocols and classical post-processing.
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7Appendix A: Finite-size estimates
Equation (1) contains three quantities to estimate –
sLX,0 and s
L
X,1, which are estimates of the number of
counts (sent and measured in the X basis) containing
zero and one photon respectively; and φUX,1 which is an
estimate of the phase error rate in the X basis counts.
As in [11], we have
sX,0 ≥ τ0
u2 − u3
(
u2e
u3n∗X,u3
pu3
− u3e
u2n∗X,u2
pu2
)
(A1)
where n∗X,uk is the number of counts (from states sent
and measured in the X basis) coming from pulses with
intensity uk, and τn :=
∑
uk
puke
−ukunk/n!. This for-
mula is valid in the asymptotic limit where the number
of counts will be equal to the expected value. In the finite
setting, we cannot know with certainty the actual value
of n∗X,uk . This is because once the raw key is generated,
we randomly choose a finite sample of L+ k states from
X basis counts. Nevertheless we are able to bound n∗X,uk
from above and below with high probability using the
statistics observed in parameter estimation. Specifically,
if nX,uk are the observed statistics, Hoeffdings inequali-
ties [15] give
n−X,uk := nX,uk − δ(L+ k, ǫPE) ≤ n∗X,uk
n+X,uk := nX,uk + δ(L+ k, ǫPE) ≥ n∗X,uk .
(A2)
These bounds hold with probability at least 1 − ǫPE ,
where δ(nX , ǫPE) :=
√
nX ln(1/ǫPE)/2. Replacing the
n∗X,uk in Eq. (A1) by the corresponding worst-case finite-
size estimate leads to a finite-size lower bound on sX,0,
which we call sLX,0, and which holds with probability at
least 1− 2ǫPE .
Similarly, we can bound sLX,1 as
sLX,1 ≥
u1τ1
u1(u2 − u3)− (u22 − u23)
[
eu2n−X,u2
pu2
− e
u3n+X,u3
pu3
+
u22 − u23
u21
(
sLX,0
τ0
− e
u1n+X,u1
pu1
)]
.
(A3)
The X basis phase errors are not directly observed in
the protocol. Instead, we relate φUX,1 to the bit error rate
in the Z basis. As in Appendix B of [11], we have
φUX,1 ≤
vUZ,1
sLZ,1
+ γ
(
α1,
vUZ,1
sLZ,1
, sLZ,1, s
L
X,1
)
, (A4)
where vUZ,1 is the upper bound on the number of bit errors
in Z basis counts coming from single photon pulses, and
γ(a, b, c, d) :=
√
(c+ d)(1− b)b
cd ln 2
log
[
c+ d
cd(1− b)b
1
a2
]
,
(A5)
where α1 comes from the calculation of the min-entropy
given in [11], and is such that α1 > 0, ǫ > 2α1 +α2 +α3.
Here ǫ is the smoothing parameter in the smooth min-
entropy.
All quantities on the right hand side of Eq. (A4) are
known, except vUZ,1 which we can find as
vUZ,1 ≤
τ1
u2 − u3
(
eu2m+Z,u2
pu2
− e
u3m−Z,u3
pu3
)
, (A6)
where the m±Z,uk are the upper and lower bounds on the
true number of bit errors from Z basis counts of inten-
sity uk. These are found from the observed number plus
finite-size variations, similar to Eq. (A2).
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
In order to guess X making fewer than r errors, Eve
will perform some optimal measurement on her system
E and from that gain a classical outcome F which is
her guess for X . This transforms ρXE to the classical
state τXF which can be represented by the probability
distribution PXF . From the data processing inequality
[21] we have
Hǫmin(X |E)ρ ≤ Hǫmin(X |F )P . (B1)
We now use the following lemma, similar to Lemma
3.1.12 from [22]:
Lemma 1. Let τXF be a classical state. Then the max-
imisation in the smooth min entropy,
Hǫmin(X |F )τ := max
τXF∈Bǫ(τXF )
sup
σF
Hmin(τXF |σF ),
is achieved for a classical τXF and a classical σF . Note
that the supremum over σ is over all density matrices
with trace 1.
Proof. To prove this, we will show that for any τ ′XF ∈
Bǫ(τXF ) and σ
′
F , there exists a classical τXF ∈ Bǫ(τXF )
and a classical σF such that
Hmin(τXF |σF ) ≥ Hmin(τ ′XF |σ′F ).
To do this, define E := EXF , the projective measurement
in the XF basis. Choose τXF := E(τ ′XF ) and σF :=
EF (σ′F ), where EF is the projective measurement in the
F basis. Since EF is a CPTP map, σF still has unit trace.
Also, we have
||τXF−τXF ||1 = ||E(τ ′XF−τXF )||1 ≤ ||τ ′XF−τXF ||1 ≤ ǫ,
where the first equality follows from the definition of E
and because τXF is classical. The first inequality follows
because the trace distance can only decrease under CPTP
maps, and the second inequality follows because τ ′XF ∈
Bǫ(τXF ). This shows that τXF ∈ Bǫ(τXF ).
8Now we use lemma 3.1.12 from [22] to say that
Hmin(τXF |σF ) ≥ Hmin(τ ′XF |σ′F )
is true if
1X ⊗ σF − E(1X ⊗ σ′F ) ≥ 0.
Plugging in the definition of E we find
1X ⊗ σF − EXF (1X ⊗ σ′F ) = 1X ⊗ σF − 1X ⊗ σF = 0,
where we have used that EXF = EX ⊗ EF when applied
to product states.
This lemma means that
Hǫmin(X |F )P = Hmin(X |F )P ′ (B2)
for some classical (possibly unnormalised) probability
distribution P ′XF . To start with, let us assume that fol-
lowing Eve’s optimal strategy, her guess, F , is jointly
distributed with X according to P ′XF . In fact, they will
be distributed according to some unknown probability
distribution PXF , but P
′
XF is ǫ-close to PXF in terms
of L1 (or trace) distance. Note that the trace distance
makes sense even for unnormalised distributions.
Let us introduce the notation
brn :=
r∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
, (B3)
Srx = {x′ ∈ X : d(x, x′) ≤ r}, (B4)
where d is the Hamming distance. Under the distribu-
tion P ′XF , Eve’s average “probability” (note again that
P ′ may not be normalised, but we will relate it to the nor-
malised probability distribution P ) of making at most r
mistakes, 〈pr〉P ′ , can be bounded as
〈pr〉P ′ =
∑
f
P ′F (f)maxx
∑
x′∈Srx
P ′X|F=f (x
′)
≤
∑
f
P ′F (f)|Srx|maxx P
′
X|F=f (x)
= brn
∑
f
P ′F (f)max
x
P ′X|F=f (x)
:= brn2
−Hmin(X|F )P ′ ,
(B5)
where P ′F is the marginal distribution of P
′
XF and the
last inequality follows from the definition of min-entropy
on classical systems [23].
Now, in fact the distribution shared by Bob and Eve
following Eve’s optimal strategy is not P ′XF , but PXF
where PXF is ǫ-close to P
′
XF . We can use the above
bound on 〈pr〉P ′ to get a bound for 〈pr〉P as follows,
〈pr〉P ′ =
∑
f
P ′F (f)max
x
∑
x′∈Srx
P ′X|F=f (x
′)
=
∑
f
P ′F (f)maxx
∑
x′∈Srx
P ′XF (x
′, f)
P ′F (f)
=
∑
f
max
x
∑
x′∈Srx
P ′XF (x
′, f).
(B6)
Let f ∈ {f1, f2, ...} and let x′i and xi be such that
max
x
∑
x′∈Srx
P ′XF (x
′, fi) =
∑
x∈Sr
x′
i
P ′XF (x, fi), (B7)
max
x
∑
x′∈Srx
PXF (x
′, fi) =
∑
x∈Srxi
PXF (x, fi), (B8)
I.e. x′i and xi specify the sets, S
r
x, which maximise the
sum in the last equality of (B6) for distributions P ′XF
and PXF respectively. Continuing from (B6) we have
〈pr〉P ′ =
∑
i
∑
x∈Sr
x′
i
P ′XF (x, fi)
≥
∑
i
∑
x∈Srxi
P ′XF (x, fi)
≥

∑
i
∑
x∈Srxi
PXF (x, fi)

 − ǫ
= 〈pr〉P − ǫ.
(B9)
So, following her optimal strategy, we can bound Eve’s
average probability of making fewer than rmistakes when
guessing the bit values of X as
〈pr〉P ≤ 〈pr〉P ′ + ǫ
≤ brn2−Hmin(X|F )P ′ + ǫ
≤ brn2−H
ǫ
min(X|E)ρ + ǫ,
(B10)
where we have used Hmin(X |F )P ′ = Hǫmin(X |F )P ≥
Hǫmin(X |E)ρ.
Appendix C: Security against repudiation
Alice aims to send a declaration (m,Sigm) which Bob
will accept and which Charlie will reject. For this to
happen, Bob must accept both the elements that Alice
sent directly to him, and the elements that Charlie
forwarded to him. In order for Charlie to reject he
need only reject either the elements he received from
Alice, or the elements Bob forwarded to him (or both).
Intuitively, security against repudiation follows because
of the symmetrisation performed by Bob and Charlie
using the secret classical channel. In the distribution
stage, to send the future message m, Alice will use the
KGP with Bob and Charlie so that they hold the strings
(b1, ..., bL) and (c1, ..., cL) respectively. We give Alice full
power and assume that later on, in the messaging stage,
she is able to fully control the number of mismatches
her signature declaration contains with (b1, ..., bL)
and (c1, ..., cL). Call the mismatch rates eB and eC
respectively. Now, the symmetrisation process means
that Bob and Charlie will randomly (and unknown to
9Alice) receive L/2 elements of the each other’s strings.
We aim to show that any choice of eC , eB leads to an
exponentially decaying probability of repudiation.
Suppose that eC > sa. In this case, Bob is select-
ing (without replacement) L/2 elements from the set
{c1, ..., cL}, which contains exactly eCL mismatches with
Alice’s future declaration. The number of mismatches
Bob selects then follows a hypergeometric distribution
H(L, eCL,L/2) with expected value eCL/2. In order to
accept the message, Bob must select fewer than saL/2
errors. Using [16] we can bound the probability that
Bob selects fewer than saL/2 mismatches as
P(Bob gets fewer than saL/2 mismatches from Charlie)
≤ exp[−(eC − sa)2L].
(C1)
To repudiate, Alice must make Bob accept the message,
which means that Bob must accept both the part
received from Alice and the part received from Charlie.
Since P(A ∩ B) ≤ min{P(A),P(B)}, the probability of
repudiation must be less than or equal to the above
expression, and so must also decrease exponentially.
Suppose that eC ≤ sa. In this case, if eB > sa,
the above argument shows that it is highly likely that
Bob will reject the message, so we consider only the
case where eB ≤ sa. Consider first the set {b1, ..., bL}.
We can use the same arguments as above to bound the
probability of selecting more than svL/2 mismatches as
P(Charlie gets more than svL/2 mismatches from Bob)
≤ exp[−(sv − eB)2L].
(C2)
Alice succeeds if Charlie selects more than svL/2 mis-
matches from either the set {b1, ..., bL} or the set
{c1, ..., cL}. Using P(A ∪ B) ≤ P(A) + P(B), we can
see that, for the choice of eB, eC ≤ sa, we have
P(Charlie gets more than svL/2 mismatches)
≤ 2 exp[−(sv − sa)2L].
(C3)
So again, the probability of Alice successfully repudiat-
ing decreases exponentially in the size of the signature.
Similar to [4], Alice’s best strategy would be to pick
eB = eC =
1
2 (sv + sa), in which case
P(Repudiation) ≤ 2 exp
[
−1
4
(sv − sa)2L
]
. (C4)
Appendix D: Calculation of the number of quantum
transmissions required per signed bit
1. Parameters and constraints
The correctness and security of the protocol depends
on the three equations (11), (14) and (15), which in turn
depend on the choice of parameters sa and sv. The pa-
rameters must be such that eUX < sa < sv < pE . Here,
and in all that follows, eUX is the maximum of the worst-
case error rates Alice makes with Bob’s key (found from
the Alice-Bob KGP), and the worst-case error rates Alice
makes with Charlie’s key (found from the Alice-Charlie
KGP). Similarly, pE is the minimum of the eavesdrop-
per’s error rates found from the Alice-Bob and Alice-
Charlie KGP. The aim is to choose the parameters that
minimise the number of quantum transmissions required
per signed bit. Note that the number of quantum trans-
missions required per signed bit is not equal to the sig-
nature length, L. In general, due to channel losses and
parameter estimation procedures, Bob will have to trans-
mit more than L quantum states to generate a signature
of length L.
In the next section, we will calculate the length of the
signature and the number of quantum transmissions nec-
essary to sign a message with a security level of 10−4.
By this, we mean that the probabilities of honest abort,
forging, and repudiation, given respectively by (11), (14)
and (15), are all less than 10−4. To find the length, per
possible one-bit message 0, 1, of the signature necessary
to securely sign a one-bit message, we must first choose
the parameters sa and sv. Ideally, our choice would min-
imise the total length of the signature, L. We choose to
set ǫPE = 10
−5 and
sa = e
U
X +
pE − eUX
3
, sv = e
U
X +
2(pE − eUX)
3
. (D1)
We note here that this may not be the optimal choices of
these parameters, however, it seems natural to choose the
parameters in order to equally partition the gap between
eUX and pE . Nevertheless, more sophisticated optimisa-
tion of the parameters may lead to better results.
2. The number of quantum transmissions required
per signed bit
In this section, we use experimental data provided by
[19] to give a rough estimate of the number of states
(per possible message bit value) Bob needs to transmit
over a 50 km quantum channel to securely sign a one-bit
message. We set ǫPE = 10
−5 in all equations that follow.
The experiment in [19] approximately achieves the values
• Source: 1GHz pulse rate
• Basis probabilities: pX = 93.75%, pZ = 6.25%.
• Intensity levels:
(u1, u2, u3) = (0.425, 0.0435, 0.0022).
• Dark count rate: pd = 2.1× 10−5
• Detector Efficiency: ηdet = 20.4%
• Channel attenuation: 0.2dB/km
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• Receiver loss: 2.8dB
• Optical bit error rate: X basis QX = 1.38%, Z
basis QZ = 0.76%
As in [24], we model the detection rates for intensity
uk as
Ruk = 1− (1 − 2pd)e−ukη (D2)
and the Z basis bit error rates as
eZ,uk =
(1− e−ukη)QZ + e−ukηpd
Ruk
, (D3)
and similarly for the X basis bit error rates, but using
QX in place of QZ . Over 50 km, the attenuation due to
channel and detector loss is ηch = 10
−1.28 = 0.0525. η
represents the overall transmission in the system, with
η = ηdetηch = 0.0107.
If we choose intensities with probabilities pu1 = 25%,
pu2 = 40% and pu3 = 35%, then if Bob transmits 6.3×108
states in total, we expect the raw key to contain 8.10×105
bit values fromX basis measurement outcomes. Of these,
Bob will randomly choose L/2 = 3.86×105 to beXB,keep,
another L/2 will be used as XB,forward and the remain-
ing k = 3.86×104 will be used to estimate the correlation
between Alice and Bob’s X basis measurement outcomes.
For the given intensity choice probabilities and error
rates, we expect to observe an X basis bit error rate of
2.87%. We can then use Eq. (9) to upper bound the true
error rate as eUX = 4.02%.
Using Appendix A and the detection/error rates given
by (D2), (D3) above, we can calculate the min-entropy.
Setting ǫ = 10−10 we use (1) to find
Hǫmin(X |E) = 1.40× 105, (D4)
Using (7) we find pE = 6.96%, and so have sa = 4.99%
and sv = 5.96%. Setting also a = 10
−5 and putting these
values into equations (11), (14) and (15) we find
P(Honest Abort) ≤ 2ǫPE = 2.00× 10−5, (D5)
P(Forge) ≤ ǫF + a+ 8ǫPE = 1.00× 10−4, (D6)
P(Repudiation) ≤ 2 exp
(
−1
4
(sv − sa)2L
)
= 2.97× 10−8.
(D7)
Thus we can see that when 6.3× 108 states are transmit-
ted, the protocol is secure to a level of 10−4. It should
be stressed that this analysis is rough, and has not been
optimised.
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